Justification trajectories for pension inequality in Chile (2016–2023)

The role of social class and beliefs in meritocracy

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Juan Carlos Castillo, Andreas Laffert, René Canales &
Tomás Urzúa

Department of Sociology, University of Chile

In_equality Conference | Panel 17: Meritocracy and Inequality Beliefs - April 2026, Universität Konstanz

Good morning everyone, I am Juan Carlos Castillo, and I am here to present our research on justification trajectories for pension inequality in Chile from 2016 to 2023. This study focuses on the role of social class and beliefs in meritocracy. The research was conducted in collaboration with my colleagues Andreas Laffert, René Canales, and Tomás Urzúa, all from the Department of Sociology at the University of Chile.

Research project

Project

• ANID/FONDECYT N°1250518 2025-2028 - Market Justice and Deservingness of Social Welfare

• Objective: Analyze market justice preferences in Chile, their evolution over time, and their relation to welfare deservingness

• Main argument: Chile’s highly commodified welfare system strengthens meritocratic deservingness beliefs, thereby increasing preferences for market justice relative to less commodified contexts

• Research design:

  • Comparative and longitudinal data analysis
  • Original survey
  • Survey experiments
  • Legislative debates on pensions

• explain market justice: justification that access to social services should be determined by market-based criteria (e.g., income)

Team

Juan Carlos Castillo (PI)

Andreas Laffert (RA)

Tomás Urzúa (RA)

René Canales (RA)

Agenda

Peer-reviewed Articles

• Castillo, J. C., Salgado, M., Carrasco, K., & Laffert, A. (2024). The Socialization of Meritocracy and Market Justice Preferences at School. Societies, 14(11), 214. doi.org/10.3390/soc14110214

• Castillo, J. C., Laffert, A., Carrasco, K., & Iturra-Sanhueza, J. (2025). Perceptions of inequality and meritocracy: their interplay in shaping preferences for market justice in Chile (2016–2023). Frontiers in Sociology, 10, 1634219. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1634219

• Castillo, J. C., Canales Sellés, R., Laffert, A., & Urzúa, T. (2026). Justification trajectories for pension inequality in Chile (2016–2023): the role of social class and beliefs in meritocracy. Frontiers in Sociology, 11, 1771856. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2026.1771856

Forthcoming

• Stability and comparability of meritocratic beliefs in school-age students: A measurement invariance approach across time and cohorts. Andreas Laffert, Juan Carlos Castillo, René Canales, Tomás Urzúa & Kevin Carrasco. Submited.

• Inequality and deservingness in higher education in Chile. A conjoint survey experiment. Juan Carlos Castillo, Andreas Laffert, René Canales & Tomás Urzúa.

• Pensions’ market justice and meritocracy: A structural equation modeling approach. Andreas Laffert, Tomás Urzúa, Juan Carlos Castillo & René Canales.

Background

The problem

1. Privatization and marketization of public goods, welfare policies, and social services (Gingrich, 2011; Streeck, 2016)

2. Changes in the institutional architecture of the welfare state; expansion of market logics (Busemeyer & Iversen, 2020; Ferre, 2023)

3. This economic order is reflected in a specific moral economy and policy feedback dynamics (Campbell, 2020; Fernandez & Jaime-Castillo, 2013; Mau, 2015)

Market justice preferences (Busemeyer, 2015; Castillo et al., 2025; Koos & Sachweh, 2019; Lindh, 2015)

• over the last decades we observe a wave of privatization and marketization of public goods (that we can even trace back to the washington consensus)

• the introduction of market logics in public goods has led to changes in the institutional architecture of the welfare state, with a shift towards more market-based policies and a reduction of redistributive policies

• from a sociological point of view, this economic order is reflected in a specific moral economy and policy feedback dynamics, where market justice preferences play a key role in shaping public opinion and policy support

• this moral economic order is reflected in the emergence of market justice preferences, which are beliefs that access to social services should be determined by market-based criteria (e.g., income)

The Chilean case

• Chile combines high inequality with limited upward mobility and strong elite closure (Flores et al., 2020; López-Roldán & Fachelli, 2021; Torche, 2014)

• Since the dictatorship (1973-1989), neoliberal reforms have deeply privatized and commodified key social services, while preserving strong state dependence (Madariaga, 2020)

• Pensions: a mandatory individual capitalization system administered by private pension funds (AFP’s) (Superintendencia, 2025)

• Pension-related social conflict (Somma et al., 2021) and contested system legitimacy (“not with my money”) (Castillo et al., 2025)

Market justice preferences

• Lane (1986): market justice vs. political justice

• Normative beliefs that legitimize the idea that access to essential social services—such as healthcare, education, or pensions—should be determined by market-based criteria (Lindh, 2015, p. 895)

• Measurement: assessing whether individuals consider it fair that access to these services depends on income (Castillo et al., 2025; Kluegel et al., 1999; Lindh, 2015)

Factors associated with market justice

Individual

• Socioeconomic status—income, education, and occupation (Busemeyer & Iversen, 2020; Koos & Sachweh, 2019; Lindh, 2015; Svallfors, 2007)
• Perceptions of inequality and meritocracy (Castillo et al., 2025)
• Economic conservatism/liberalism (Lee & Stacey, 2024)

Contextual

• Social spending (Busemeyer, 2015; Busemeyer & Iversen, 2020; Immergut & Schneider, 2020)
• Economic inequality (Koos & Sachweh, 2019)
• Degree of privatization and market regulation (Koos & Sachweh, 2019; Lindh, 2015)

This study

Analyze the relationship between social class and preferences for market justice in pensions in Chile, and how these evolve over time

Examine the role of meritocracy in shaping the relationship between class and preferences for pension market justice

Hypotheses

Figure 1: Hypotheses diagram

• in the following diagram we summarize our hypotheses regarding the relationship between social class, meritocratic beliefs, and preferences for market justice in pensions in Chile. We distinguish between two levels of analysis: the within-individual level (changes over time) and the between-individual level (average differences between individuals).

• regarding meritocracy, we expect that individuals with stronger meritocratic beliefs will be more likely to support market justice, regardless of their social class. This is because they may perceive the market as a fair mechanism for allocating resources based on individual effort and talent.

• as we have longitudinal data, we estimate to what extent changes in meritocratic beliefs over time are associated with changes in market justice preferences.

• as social class is concerned, we expect that individuals from higher social classes will be more likely to support market justice, as they may benefit more from a market-based allocation of resources.

• however, we also expect that class moderates the relationship between meritocracy and market justice preferences, such that the positive association between meritocratic beliefs and market justice preferences is stronger among individuals from higher social classes -> at both levels (within - between).

Methodology

Data

• ELSOC (COES): a representative panel survey of the urban adult population in Chile, based on a probabilistic, stratified, clustered, and multistage sampling design across large and small cities

• Period: six waves (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2022, and 2023)

• Attrition 2016→2023: ~ 40%

• Analytical sample (balanced 6-wave panel):

  • N = 7,522 observations (level 1) nested within
  • N = 1,317 individuals (level 2)

Dependent variable

• Item: ¿“It is fair that people with higher incomes have better pensions than people with lower incomes?”

Figure 2: Distribution of responses for preferences for market justice in pensions in Chile (2016–2023)

• the dependent variable is preferences for market justice in pensions, measured with the item “It is fair that people with higher incomes have better pensions than people with lower incomes?” (5-point Likert scale)

• as we observe in the alluvial diagram, there is a clear trend towards more agreement with market justice in pensions, changing from 17% in 2016 to 29.4% in 2023, representing an increase of about 60%.

Independent variables: Level 1

Figure 3: Distribution of responses for meritocracy items

Independent variables: Level 2

Figure 4: Frecuency of class position

• Fixed at the first wave (i.e., time-invariant) → captures average between-person differences (BE = \(\bar X_{i}\))

Estimation strategy

Cumulative link mixed models (CLMM):

• Panel structure: repeated observations (level 1) nested within individuals (level 2)

• Models both within-person (WE) and between-person (BE) effects; includes random effects (intercept and time slope)

• WE/BE decomposition (person-mean centering) (Bell et al., 2019):

  • Within: \(X^{WE}_{it}= X_{it}-\bar{X}_i\)
  • Between: \(X^{BE}_{i}=\bar{X}_i\)

• Formally:

\[\begin{aligned} \eta_{it} = \beta_{0}+ \beta_{1}\,\text{Time}_{it} +\beta_2\,\text{Meritocracy}^{WE}_{it} +\beta_3\,\text{Meritocracy}^{BE}_{i} +\beta_4\,\mathrm{Class}^{BE}_i + \end{aligned}\]

\[\beta_5\,(\mathrm{Class}^{BE}_i\!\times\! \text{Meritocracy}^{WE}_{it}) +\beta_6\,(\mathrm{Class}^{BE}_i\!\times\! \text{Meritocracy}^{BE}_{i}) +u_{0i}+u_{1i}\,\text{Time}_{it}\\\]

Results

Models

Figure 5: Changes across waves in market justice preferences in pensions

• ICC = 0.23 between, 0.77 within

Models

Figure 6: Main within- and between-person effects on market justice preferences in pensions

• All models control for: gender, age, educational level, and political identification

Discussion

1. Time: Preferences for market justice in pensions have increased in recent years in Chile

2. Social class: Higher social classes don’t exhibit greater support for market justice in pensions than lower classes (H1) (Busemeyer & Iversen, 2020; Kerner, 2020; Lindh, 2015)

3. Meritocracy: The belief that effort is rewarded is associated with higher support for market justice in pensions (H2a and H2b) (Castillo et al., 2025)

4. Class × Meritocracy: There is no evidence of an amplification effect (H3a/H3b)

Caveats

• No evidence of class differences in support for pension market justice, but what about a more direct measure of stratification differences?

• Meritocratic beliefs show a strong and consistent effect. Yet, are measured in a highly reduced way, through effort and talent only

The role of income and education

Figure 7: Main within- and between-person effects on market justice preferences in pension

Pension market justice and multidimensional meritocratic beliefs

(Work in progress)

Thank you, Juan Carlos.

Regarding the last ˈkavēˌät, we conducted an additional analysis using a multidimensional measurement model of meritocratic beliefs for survey research, developed by Juan Carlos and other team members, including Julio, who is here in the audience. And the goal here is to iɡˈzamən how different dimensions of meritocratic beliefs relate to pension market justice.

This is still a work in progress, and we would be very glad to hear your feedback.

Multidimensional framework of meritocracy

Castillo et al. (2023) measurement model

To approach meritocracy, we use a multidimensional framework. This model expands the usual way meritocracy is measured in empirical research.

Multidimensional framework of meritocracy

Castillo et al. (2023) measurement model

Most studies focus only on meritocratic perceptions, that is, whether people believe that effort and ability are actually rewarded in society. This is represented in the upper-left corner of the diagram.

Multidimensional framework of meritocracy

Castillo et al. (2023) measurement model

What this model adds is, first, a distinction between perceptions and preferences, where perceptions refer to how people think society works and preferences refer to how they think it should work. This is represented in the upper-right corner using the same items, but with a normative sense.

Multidimensional framework of meritocracy

Castillo et al. (2023) measurement model

Second, it also incorporates non-meritocratic elements, captured through items on family wealth and social connections, both of which are shown at the bottom of the diagram. We call this dimension non-meritocratic privilege.

Multidimensional framework of meritocracy

Castillo et al. (2023) measurement model

So, in total, the scale distinguishes four dimensions: perceived meritocracy, perceived non-meritocracy, preference for meritocracy, and preference for non-meritocracy. This means that recognizing privilege does not oppose supporting merit. Both can coexist within the same belief system in terms of perceptions and preferences.

Also, you can see the two items for each factor, all measured on a four-point agreement scale.

Data

• EDUMERCO: Online survey (CAWI), fielded in 2025, with adult respondents from the Metropolitan Region of Chile

• Non-probability sample with quota-based design
  → approximating population parameters by age, gender, education, and socioeconomic status

• Total sample: N = 3,470

• Analytical sample: N = 2,557

For this analysis, we use data from an online CAWI survey conducted in two thousand twenty-five among adolts in the Metropolitan Region of Chile. The resulting analytical sample consisted of two thousand five hundred and fifty-seven individuals.

Analytical strategy

• First, we estimate a Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the multidimensional meritocracy scale
  → good model fit (CFI = 0.995, TLI = 0.991, RMSEA = 0.048)

• Second, we estimate a Structural Equation Model
  → pension market justice regressed on latent meritocracy factors

\[ \text{MJP}_{i} = \alpha + \beta_1 \eta^{PM}_{i} + \beta_2 \eta^{PNM}_{i} + \beta_3 \eta^{PrM}_{i} + \beta_4 \eta^{PrNM}_{i} + \gamma'X_i + \varepsilon_i \]

• Estimation: WLSMV
  → appropriate for ordinal (Likert-type) data (Kline, 2023)

Methodologically, we prəˈsēd in two steps. First, we estimate a confirmatory factor analysis of the multidimensional scale, which showed a good fit to the data. This adds evidence in line with the leitent structure of the scale.

Second, we estimate a structural equation model in which pension market justice is regressed on the leitent meritocracy factors. This allauwas to model the covariance among the items, recover the underlying dimensions of meritocratic beliefs, and estimate how each of them relates to support for market justice. Formally, the outcome is modeled as a function of the scale’s four leitent dimensions, along with the same controls as in the main paper.

Results

Descriptive

Figure 8: Distribution of responses on the scale of perceptions and preferences regarding meritocracy

Here we see the distribution of responses for the meritocracy scale items, separating perceptions from preferences. The descriptive pattern suggests that respondents tend to perceive effort and talent as less rewarded, whereas family wealth and social connections are more highly rewarded. NOR-mə-tiv-lee, however, they prefer effort—and to a lesser extent talent—to be rewarded, while attitudes toward non-meritocratic ad-VAN-tih-jiz are more divided.

These risolts suggest that Chileans largely see privilege as more dəˈsīsiv than merit, even dou effort remains the ideal they most strongly support.

Model

Figure 9: Structural equation model

The structural equation model reveals a different picture.

First, consistent with our previous paper, perceiving society as meritocratic is associated with greater support for pension market justice. We see this as an important replication, because with different data and a different technique, we find the same substantive pattern. But once we treat meritocratic beliefs as multidimensional, new findings appear.

Perceiving society as non-meritocratic is associated with lower support for pension market justice. A possible interpretation is that seeing society as shaped by privilege rather than merit may increase awareness of inequality and reduce its justification in domeins such as pensions.

By contrast, we haven’t found an effect for preferences for meritocracy, perhaps because this factor has little variation, as most people normatively support meritocratic principles.

Finally, the most striking result, in our view, is that stronger support for non-meritocratic ad-VAN-tij is associated with higher support for pension market justice. And it is the larger effect. We think it might be related to embracing privilege, but this is a new finding, and we look forward to discussing it with you.

Overall, this analysis suggests that it is not enough to talk about meritocracy in general. Its different dimensions matter, and they do not all work in the same way.

With that, I hand it back to Juan Carlos for the concluding remarks.

Conclusions and implications

1. Reflection of market-based welfare on public attitudes (Busemeyer & Iversen, 2020; Lindh, 2015) -> increasing support for neoliberal arrangements

2. Effort-based meritocratic perceptions are positively associated with pension market justice, both between and within individuals

3. Chile: Support remains minority but is rising over time, consistent with longitudinal evidence from a highly commodified welfare context

4. Expanding meritocracy analysis: the multidimensional measure of meritocracy offers new insights regarding the role of non-meritocratic (privelege) factors.

Next steps

• Market justice measurement: We are refining the measure and extending it to additional welfare domains (as health and education)

• Class measurement: Despite the null findings, we do not abandon the argument that objective stratification shapes these preferences; we will test alternative measures of class and inequality

• Meritocracy: use of latent clases/profiles in order to capture different combinations of meritocratic beliefs, and their relationship with market justice preferences

• Comparative analysis: we are extending the analysis to ISSP data in order to compare the Chilean case with other welfare contexts

• Experimental analysis: design of survey experiments to test the causal effect of meritocratic beliefs on market justice preferences

Thanks you for your attention!

Comments most welcome 🫡

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Supplementary Material

Bivariate

Figure 10: Correlation matrix between market justice and meritocracy scale

MIMIC Model: Education

Figure 11: MIMIC Model for market justice preferences in education

MIMIC Model: Healthcare

Figure 12: MIMIC Model for market justice preferences in healthcare